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The Effect on Annuities Preference of Prompts to Consider Life Expectancy: Evidence 
from a UK quota sample 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the largest and most consequential financial decisions that a person can be asked to 
make in the course of her life is how to decumulate the wealth in her private pension. Should 
you buy an annuity (a stream of income that is guaranteed for life) or take a cash lump sum? 
Because it involves pension wealth that has typically accumulated over the course of decades 
of contributions, the decision offers people the opportunity to walk away with more money 
than most will have seen in their lives up to that point. It is not merely the amount of money 
that makes the decision high stakes, however; a potential outcome is penury in old age. 
Further complicating matters, feedback on the quality of one’s decision comes slowly, is 
difficult to evaluate and may only prove conclusive when it is too late to correct for the initial 
mistake.  
 
The pensions decumulation decision warrants the attention of policy makers and pensions 
providers because longer lifespans and the rise of defined contribution pensions mean that 
increasing numbers of people worldwide will be charged with the task of making 
decumulation choices in the coming decades. Moreover, the international experience is that 
far fewer people choose to decumulate their pensions in the form of an annuity than would be 
predicted given the expected financial benefits of annuitizing (Benartzi, Previtero and Thaler, 
2011; Duxbury, Summers, Hudson, and Keasey, 2013; Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004; 
Pashchenko 2013; O’Meara, Sharma & Bruhn, 2015). This is termed the annuitization puzzle 
and various explanations have been posited to account for it, some rooted in the behavioural 





whereby a cash lump sum is wrongly perceived to be more generous than the equivalent 
amount paid out each month as an annuity (Goldstein, Hirschfeld and Benartzi, 2016). 
Second, present-bias reduces annuities preference (Brown and Previtero, 2014; Schreiber and 
Weber, 2016). Third, Salisbury and Nenkov demonstrate in a series of studies a mortality 
salience effect, such that evoking the concept of death reduces preference for annuities 
(2016). Finally, it was found in a UK sample that removing the word “annuity” from the 
description of an annuities product increased preference for it by 16 percent (FCA, 2014).  
 
The current research tests how annuities preference is affected by a prompt to consider how 
long retirement will last. This question is of practical interest because a recommendation to 
consider “how long your pension needs to last” is currently broadcast on the UK’s state-run 
Pension Wise website (Figure 1a) and a prompt to consider “how long you might live” 
appears on the US Social Security public advice website (Figure 1b). Notwithstanding that it 
is currently in use, we can find no tests of the effect on decumulation decisions of prompting 
consideration of retirement duration. This dearth of published evidence is particularly striking 
because prior literatures offer contradictory predictions on the likely effect of the prompt. 
Before setting out our study, let’s briefly consider the predictions of theory. Both the US and 
the British websites prompt people to consider their retirement duration and offers them a life 
expectancy calculator for that purpose. Based on the prior literature, we identify three 
independent effects of this treatment: an attention effect that predicts an increase in annuities 





and a mortality salience effect that predicts a decrease in annuities preference. 
 
Figure 1a: Screenshot from the UK public information website of the prompt to 
consider how long your pension needs to last (Pension Wise, 2019) 
 
Figure 1b: Screenshot from the US public information website of the prompt to consider 





We find in a national quota sample of over 2,000 Britons that the effect of following the 
recommendation to consider life expectancy is to reduce preference for annuities. Given the 
various and contradictory predictions of theory we did not consider it feasible that this study 
would trace through the various mechanisms through which the life expectancy prompt has its 
effect. We do, however, offer some post hoc analyses on this question and present some 
descriptive data in this regard. Notably, we ask respondents to rank five considerations that 
Beshears et al. (2014) found to be important when decumulating pension savings. This 
analysis shows that prompting respondents to estimate the age they will die by systematically 
altered priorities; it reduced the importance placed on two attributes on which annuities are 
strong (Income Security and Income Certainty) relative to the control condition and increasing 
the importance placed on an attribute on which annuities are weak, bequest motives. 
 
This research contributes to several literatures that are of interest to public economists. First, 
it contributes to the growing literature on the annuities puzzle. O’Dea and Sturrock (2018; 
2019) suggest that underannuitization might be partly explained by systematic 
underestimation of life expectancy and predict that informing people of their life expectancy 
could contribute towards redressing the bias against annuities (ibid, 2019, p. 20). The 
literature is conflicting regarding this prediction, however. Beshears et al. exposed people to 
mortality tables, which set out objective survival probabilities for people of the same age and 
sex as the respondent, and found a reduction in preference for annuities (2014). In what 
follows we find that prompting people to estimate their own life expectancy reduces 
preference for annuities, echoing the results of Beshears et al. (2014). We conclude that, 
contrary to the prediction of O’Dea and Sturrock (2019), consideration of life expectancy 
actually reduces preference for annuities. Second, it contributes to the literature on economic 





been considered to have meaningful economic consequences: Terror Management Theory 
(e.g. Arndt and McCabe, 2016; Burke, Martens, and Faucher, 2010; Greenberg and Arndt, 
2011). We highlight Terror Management Theory because it alone correctly and 
unambiguously predicted the results observed in the current research (Salisbury and Nenkov, 
2016). With hindsight, the results of this specific study might be explained by mechanisms 
unrelated to Terror Management Theory; still we consider Terror Management Theory to 
offer predictions that warrant the attention of economists and policymakers working on end-
of-life topics. Third, this study contributes to the literature on the role for randomized 
controlled trials in policymaking (e.g. Deaton and Cartwright, 2018). Our research documents 
a case in which a public policy intervention appears to backfire: we doubt that anyone 
working on the UK and the US advice websites suspected that recommending consideration 
of life expectancy would exacerbate the problem of underannuitization. The current research 
is therefore an instructive case study.  
 
In the next section we briefly outline some theories that offer conflicting predictions 
regarding the recommendation to consider retirement duration. Section 3 details our 
experimental design. Section 4 reports the results. In Section 5 we conclude. 
 
2. Theory 
Here we review three literatures that offer predictions regarding the effect of the 
recommendations to consider retirement duration and life expectancy. The first literature we 
consider is that on the gap between subjective life expectancy and objective life expectancy. 
There is a robust finding in the literature on subjective life expectancy that younger people 
underestimate their life expectancy, but that this tendency reduces with age; this pattern has 





(O’Dea and Sturrock, 2018). This downward bias in anticipated lifespan has been 
hypothesized to explain part of the annuities puzzle (O’Dea and Sturrock, 2019).  
O’Dea and Sturrock (2019) suggest that an intervention that increases the accuracy of 
subjective life expectancy will increase preference for annuities. In a recent paper they 
endorsed the life expectancy information on the US Social Security webpage as a means to 
attenuate the bias against annuities and advocated a “role for larger policy interventions to 
inform households about the length of the retirement that they might have to fund” (O’Dea 
and Sturrock, 2019, p. 20). Their suggestion has been tested. In a stated preference study, 
Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Zeldes (2014) found that preference for annuities was 
altered following exposure to objective life expectancy information; contrary to O’Dea and 
Sturrock’s prediction, however, annuities preference was reduced. In any case, Beshears et al. 
explained the observed reduction with reference to the same underlying causal mechanism as 
O’Dea and Sturrock (2019): they speculated that exposure to the objective life expectancy 
information caused respondents to update their subjective life expectancy (Beshears et al., 
2014 p.13).  
 
Whereas Beshears et al, (2014) tested the effect of presenting life expectancy information, our 
contribution is to test the effect of merely asking people to estimate their life expectancy. It is 
possible that prompting people to articulate their expected age of death causes them to 
generate a more considered life expectancy estimate than if the question of life expectancy is 
left implicit. Relatedly, the estimate that people come to can be influenced by the question by 
which life expectancy is elicited (Payne, Sagara, Shu, Appelt and Johnson, 2013; Comerford 
and Robinson, 2017). Thus, the mere fact of being asked to estimate life expectancy could 





the predictions of O’Dea and Sturrock (2019) and Beshears et al. (2014), shift preference for 
annuities. 
 
A second relevant literature for predicting the effect of the recommendation is that on limited 
attention and salience (e.g. DellaVigna, 2009). Prompting consideration of a factor 
immediately prior to choice would be expected to make it cognitively accessible. In a 
situation where people face trade-offs and must weigh up many different factors, an attribute 
that enjoys increased cognitive accessibility would be expected to receive increased decision 
weight (e.g. Biehal & Chakravarti, 1983; Johnson, Haubl and Keinan, 2007; Weber, Johnson, 
Milch, Chang, Brodscholl, and Goldstein, 2007; Wyer, 2008).  
The prompt to consider retirement duration draws attention to an unambiguously relevant 
consideration: all else being equal, the expected value of an annuity is increasing in retirement 
duration. To the extent that the annuities puzzle is explained by misweighting of cues in the 
decision criterion (e.g. attaching weight to use of the term “annuity” to describe the product as 
found in FCA, 2014), we would expect the prompt to increase preference for annuities. In 
short, annuities preference is expected to increase due to the attention effect. 
 
The third literature we have found that speaks to this question is that on Terror Management 
Theory and mortality salience (Salisbury and Nenkov, 2016). Terror Management Theory 
posits that the mere thought of death evokes defensive responses, which include an aversion 
to death-related stimuli (e.g. McCabe and Arndt, 2016). Salisbury and Nenkov reasoned that 
“by forcing people to think about dying, the annuity decision makes people's mortality salient, 
motivating them to defend against this threat by avoiding the annuity option” (2016, p. 418). 
In line with this prediction, prompting mortality salience was found to reduce preference for 





described either as making payments “each year you live” or as making payments “each year 
you live until you die”; the addition of the three words “until you die” reduced annuities 
preference from 36 percent to 26 percent (Salisbury and Nenkov, 2016, p. 421).  The US and 
UK websites make mortality salient by offering a life expectancy calculator (Figures 1a and 
1b) and, in the US case, by making explicit reference to “how long you might live” (Figure 
1b). Terror Management Theory predicts that these prompts to consider life expectancy will 
reduce preference for annuities. 
 
We have briefly reviewed three literatures that imply three distinct effects of the prompts that 
are currently in use on US and UK pensions advice websites. These three effects identified by 
the literature operate independently of one another. Also, the attention effect and the mortality 
salience effect work in opposite directions. Whether the net effect of the recommendations 
presented on the US and UK websites is to increase or decrease annuities preference is a 




This study elicits a stated preference, in common with most of the literature that seeks to 
understand the decision making processes that underpin the annuitization decision (e.g. 
Beshears et al., 2014; FCA, 2014; Goedde-Menke, Lehmensiek-Starke, and  Nolte, 2014; 
Goldstein et al., 2016; Salisbury and Nenkov, 2016; Schreiber and Weber, 2016).We ask a 
quota sample of Britons to choose between taking their pension in cash and taking it as an 
annuity that pays a guaranteed income each year for the rest of the recipient’s life.  
The Pension Wise prompt refers to two distinct concepts: how long the pension needs to 





we could manipulate how explicitly we refer to life expectancy in our survey instrument. We 
test three alternative frames of the prompt: a frame that asks how long your retirement will 
last; a frame that asks what age you will live to; and a frame that asks what age you will die 
by.  
We look to the UK for two reasons. First, the UK Pension Wise website currently uses the 
retirement duration prompt and so its population is the most policy relevant for assessing the 
effects of that prompt. A second reason why a UK quota sample is particularly instructive is 
that the UK’s institutional environment relating to pensions has recently changed 
dramatically. It had been the case up to the early 2000s that the vast majority of UK pensions 
were de facto annuities; they were Defined Benefit pensions that guaranteed the recipient a 
portion of her salary for the rest of her life. Since then, workplace pensions have become 
Defined Contribution pensions (along the lines of 401Ks), where workers and employers pay 
into a pot each month and at the end of the career the worker receives whatever wealth has 
accumulated. Up until 1995, annuitization of Defined Contribution pension pots was 
compulsory for the over 55s and until 2015, annuitization at age 75 was compulsory except 
under specific circumstances (Banks, Crawford and Tetlow, 2015).   A series of “Pensions 
Freedom” reforms introduced in 2015 removed this annuitization requirement and gave 
retirees an option never previously available: to take their pensions in a full cash lump sum on 
reaching retirement (for details see Thurley, 2014; Banks, Crawford and Tetlow, 2015). 
Simultaneously, a policy of workplace pension automatic enrolment has seen a large increase 
in the number of UK citizens who will eventually face a pensions decumulation decision 
(Cribb & Emmerson, 2016). To our knowledge, this is the first survey of pension 








A quota sample that was intended to match the characteristics of the UK population aged over 
18 (N=2096) undertook an online self-completion survey as the first section in a multi-survey 
questionnaire, on 14-16 June 2016.  The sample was selected from Populus’s proprietary 
panel of 130,000 UK adults.  Quotas were set on age, gender and region based on the known 
profile of the UK from the 2012 National Readership Survey, a random probability face-to-
face survey conducted annually with 34,000 adults.  
3.2.2. Materials 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of four conditions (see Table 1). Three of these 
survey conditions opened with a question regarding how long the participant’s money would 
need to last in retirement. The control condition asked how many years the respondent spent 
in formal education. The control condition was intended (1) to have no effect on annuities 
preference relative to the absence of a prompting question, (2) to make the duration of the 
survey similar across conditions and (3) to ensure that respondents in every condition are 
prompted to consider a span of years. 
 
Our dependent variable is choice between annuitization and encashment. The annuity product 
offered was a guaranteed income paid to an individual recipient that expires at death. The 
Table 1: Prompts Used in Each Survey Condition 
Prompt Survey Wording 
Control  I took part in formal education for a total of __ years 
Retirement duration I expect my retirement to last __ years 
Live-to I expect to live to age __ 





concept of an annuity was explained to participants using wording taken from the UK’s 
Pension Wise websiteii: Preference was elicited using the following question: 
“[You said that you {expect to live to x/ expect to die by x/ expect to have a 
retirement lasting x years/ completed x years of formal education}.]  Please assume 
that you are reaching retirement and have a defined contribution pension pot.  
Which of the following would you choose: 
 
Guaranteed Income (annuity):  You use your pot to buy an insurance policy that 
guarantees you an income for the rest of your life – no matter how long you live.  
You can take 25% of your pot as tax-free cash and buy an annuity with the other 
75%. 
 
Take Cash:  This can be done in either of two ways: 
In Chunks: You can take smaller sums of money from your pot until you run out. 
Your 25% tax-free amount isn’t paid in one lump sum – you get it over time, or 
Take your whole pot in one go: You can cash in your entire pot – 25% is tax free, 
the rest is taxable. 
 
Order effects were ruled out by randomising the presentation of the choice options.  Radio 
buttons were not shown to participants until after a three-second lag set to ensure that the 
question was read fully before an answer was selected. 
So as to promote external validity we deliberately did not specify how large a pension 
pot participants are decumulating. This contrasts with the most recent study on annuities 
preferences in the UK, which told participants that they had a pension pot of £100,000 (FCA, 





that the average UK resident can expect to decumulate. In 2012 the median pension pot held 
by those UK residents aged 55-64 who have DC pensions was £25,000 (ONS, 2014).  
After reporting their pension choice, participants were asked to rank five attributes of 
retirement savings in order of importance when considering how they would use their pension 
pot from 1 (high) to 5 (low). These were Bequest, Income Security, Certainty, Flexibility and 
Control and the full descriptions, as shown to respondents, are reported in Table 2.  These 
attributes were selected for inclusion because they were found to be important drivers of the 
decumulation decision in Beshears et al. (2014). This attribute-ranking task also offers 
exploratory data on whether the prompts alter people’s pension decumulation motives. The 
order in which the attributes were presented was randomised to rule out order effects. 
 
 
We closed our survey instrument by asking if respondents had a defined contribution pension 
pot and, if so, to report its approximate size on an ordinal scale. In addition to the data we 
collected, the market research company that recruited the sample provided us with data on 
Table 2: Pension Attributes that were ranked for importance by respondents 
Pension Attribute Wording used in Survey 
Flexibility Being able to access variable amounts of money 
Control Being able to choose your own investments to create an 
income from your pension pot 
Security Knowing you won’t run out of money because your income is 
fixed for the rest of your life 
Certainty Knowing exactly what your income will be in future 
Bequest Being able to leave money from your pension pot to your 





respondent characteristics. These included income (measured by income bands on an ordinal 
scale), marital status, age, gender, whether the respondent has children, respondent’s religious 
affiliation, whether the respondent has a chronic illness and socioeconomic group (derived 
from ONS methodology, see note to table 3 for a more complete description). 
Table 3: Sample Means by Condition  
Variable Control 
Retire 
duration Live-to Die-by 
 
DV: Proportion choosing 
annuities 0.73 0.69 0.67* 0.64** 
Respondent characteristics collected in our survey: 
Age  47.29 47.97 48.76 47.60 
Does not have DC pension 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.45 
Doesn’t know if DC pension 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Already drawing DC pension  0.17 0.22** 0.20 0.21 
Size of pension pot (if known) £30k - £40k £30k - £40k £30k - £40k £30k - £40k 
Doesn’t know pension pot size 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.22 
Respondent characteristics provided by market research company: 
Female 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Income band £28k - £34k £28k - £34k £28k - £34k £28k - £34k 
Did not report income 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 
Socioeconomic Group 2.47 2.38 2.45 2.43 
Has children 0.71 0.75 0.71 0.76 
No religious affiliation 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.38 
Married or cohabiting  0.60 0.60 0.61 0.55 
No chronic illness 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.74 
 n = 524 n = 525 n = 526 n = 521 
Notes:  
DC pension refers to a Defined Contribution pension, the type for which the annuities vs. 
encashment choice is relevant. 
Socioeconomic Group is categorized using a measure employed by the British Office for 
National Statistics. It employs an algorithm that, on the basis of education, occupation, and 
housing characteristics, categorises census respondents into one of six social grades (UK 
Geographics, 2017). In the data we received, the two lowest social grades were pooled to 
create group 1, which accounts for 27 percent of the sample; and the two highest social 
grades were pooled to create group 4, which accounts for 26 percent of the sample.  
* differs from Control Condition at p < .05, ** differs from Control Condition at p < .01 
 
3.2.4. Estimation Strategy 
Table 3 reports summary statistics of respondents by survey condition. Generally, 





conditions. In what follows, we first present the results of bivariate regressions that do not 
control for any other variables and we then report analyses from a richer model that controls 
for survey condition and all of the respondent characteristics reported in Table 3.  
In our survey, we collected information on whether the participant has a DC pension 
(categorical data) and on the size of that pension (ordinal data). We also include this in our 
richer model. Our richer model does not include respondents’ rankings of pension attributes 
because these rankings were systematically impacted by prompting condition. Were we to 
include pension attribute rankings in the model then the estimated effect of the prompts would 
be biased by collinearity. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. The Effects of Prompts 
Figure 2 graphs the percentage of respondents choosing to annuitize by condition. It shows 
that annuitization was highest in the control condition and lowest in the die-by condition.  
 
Figure 2: Percentage choosing to annuitize by condition 
To understand the different effects of the prompts, we test the effect relative to the control 
















Table 4: Results of Binary Logistic Regression on Annuities Preference 
Retire duration prompt condition -0.224 
 (0.138) 
Live-to prompt condition -0.298* 
 (0.137) 




Does not have DC pension 0.028 
 (0.140) 
Doesn’t know if DC pension -0.400 
 (0.258) 
Already drawing DC pension 0.105 
 (0.165) 
Size of pension pot (if known) -0.036 
 (0.025) 




Income band 0.019 
 (0.024) 
Did not report income -0.307 
 (0.302) 
Socioeconomic group -0.027 
 (0.048) 
Has children 0.184 
 (0.120) 
No religious affiliation 0.052 
 (0.102) 








Constant  0.756* 
 (0.348) 
Observations 2,096 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses 
* differs from Control Condition at p < .05; ** differs from Control Condition at p < .01 
 
Binary logistic regressions that do not control for any other variable show that preference for 
annuities was significantly lower in each of the two conditions that prompted consideration of 
life expectancy than in the control condition (die-by condition vs. control: n = 1045; b = -
.411, z = 3.06, p = .002; live-to condition vs. control: n = 1050, b = -.277, z = 2.05, p = .040). 





condition though this difference is not statistically significant (Retirement duration condition 
vs. control: n = 1049, b = -.210, z = 1.54, p = .123). Table 4 shows that these results are robust 
to the inclusion of controls. 
 
4.2. Robustness Checks 
We were not expecting that prompting people to consider life expectancy would reduce 
preference for annuities and so we first investigate the effect of our control condition, which 
prompted participants to report the number of years they spent in formal education. We 
cannot test the effect of the control condition relative to a no-prompt condition but one test 
that is available to us concerns the correlation between reported years of education and 
preference for annuities: if prompting people to consider the years they spent in education 
increases their preference for annuities then we would expect that this effect is stronger for 
those who spent longer in education. We find that this correlation coefficient is low and not 
statistically significant, r = .04, t = .91, p = .36. Our results do not look to be explained by our 
control condition increasing preference for annuities. 
The above results include data from respondents who reported that they have already started 
claiming pension benefits (n = 419). These respondents are less likely than the rest of the 
sample to make a decumulation decision in the future and so, to deliver what might be 
considered a more policy-relevant estimate of the effect, we reran the model set out in Table 4 
having dropped them from the sample. Again, none of the prompts show positive coefficients 
(n = 1,677; live-to: b = -.288, z = 1.92, p = .055; die-by: b = -.490, z = 3.31, p = .001; 








4.3. Post-Hoc Tests for Mechanism 
Recall that we asked respondents to rank five considerations that the previous literature 
suggests are important when decumulating pension savings. This allows us to explore whether 
the effect of the life expectancy prompt is to alter priorities and, if so, to reveal what 
considerations become prioritized in response to each prompt. We did not have specific 
hypotheses on how these considerations would be affected by the prompts and so these 
analyses are post hoc and should be considered exploratory.  
Table 5: Percentage of respondents ranking attribute as most important, by condition 
 Control Retire duration Live-to Die-by 
Income Security 52 47 43 47 
Certainty 26 29 28 22 
Control 11 11 14 15 
Flexibility 8 9 11 11 
Bequest motives 3 4 4 5 
 
For these analyses, we tested the rank ordering of pension attributes in each of the prompting 
conditions compared with those in the control condition. We highlight three results from these 
analyses. The first is that there was a large degree of consensus across conditions on which 
considerations to prioritize (Table 5). In all conditions, Income Security, which was explained 
to respondents as “knowing you won’t run out of money because your income is fixed for the 
rest of your life”, was most likely to be ranked most important. In all conditions, Income 
Certainty, which was explained to respondents as “knowing exactly what your income will be 
in future”, was next most likely to be ranked as the highest priority and was most likely to be 
ranked as second most important. In all conditions, Bequest, which was explained as “being 
able to leave money from your pension pot to your surviving relatives or other beneficiaries” 







Figure 3: Ranking of Income Security in terms of importance by survey condition 
The second result is that relative to the control condition there was a reduction in the degree 
to which Income Security was considered a priority in the three treatment conditions. A binary 
logistic regression of ranking Income Security highest shows that respondents in the control 
condition were significantly more likely to rank it highest than were those in any of the three 
treatment conditions (n = 2,096, z = 2.60, p = .009). A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis rank-
sum test (which tests not only whether Income Security was ranked first, but considers where 
it featured in each respondent’s full rank ordering) delivers a similar conclusion: Income 
Security was ranked as less of a priority in each of the three prompting conditions than in the 
control condition. As depicted in Figure 3, the reduction is not large but was statistically 
significant in the die-by condition (rank sumdie by = 283,836.5 vs. rank sumcontrol =  262,698.5, 
chi-square = 6.30, p = .012) and the live-to condition (rank sumlive to= 291,627.5 vs. rank 
sumcontrol =  260,147.5, chi-square = 11.017, p < .001). The reduction was not statistically 
significant in the retirement duration condition (rank sumretire duration= 267,607.5 vs. rank 
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The third result is that the die-by frame most strongly altered respondents’ priorities relative 
to the control condition (see Figure 4). Whereas the live-to and retirement duration conditions 
showed differences relative to the control condition only in the ranking of Income Security, 
the die-by condition also caused respondents to rank Certainty (knowing exactly what your 
income will be in the future) as less important relative to the control condition (rank sumdie-by 
= 284348.50  vs. rank sumcontrol = 262186.50, chi-square = 6.47, p = .011). It caused 
respondents to rank Bequest motives as more important than did those in the control condition 
(rank sumdie-by = 258,045.50 vs. rank sumcontrol =  288,489.50, chi-square = 10.37, p = .001). 
 
Figure 4: The Die-by frame resulted in Income Certainty being ranked less important 
and Bequest Motives being ranked more important relative to the control condition 
 
These exploratory analyses suggest that prompting consideration of life expectancy has the 
effect of shifting priorities with regard to pension decumulation. This shift in ranking is 
sensibly related to the reduction in annuities preference reported above: those who were asked 
“what age will you die by?” ranked the attributes on which annuities are strong (income 
security, income certainty) as less of a priority than those in the control condition and ranked 






























control condition. It follows therefore that those who were asked “what age will you die by?” 
would value annuities less than do those in the control condition.  
 
The reduction in preference for annuities is consistent with the prior literature (e.g. Beshears 
et al., 2014; Salisbury and Nenkov, 2016) and accords with the predictions of Terror 
Management Theory (Salisbury and Nenkov, 2016). However, our reading of the literature on 
Terror Management Theory did not lead us to clear predictions on which of the five pension 
attributes would become more or less a priority as a response to death-related stimuli. Also 
anonymous reviewers helpfully pointed out alternative mechanisms. Whereas Terror 
Management Theory posits that death-related thoughts trigger certain motivated responses 
(i.e. a shunning of death related stimuli), an alternative effect of considering one’s own death 
might be to focus attention on one’s legacy. To the extent that consideration of death causes 
people to care more about the bequest they leave behind, this could also account for our 
results. Furthermore, we cannot rule out that differences in subjective estimates of life 
expectancy across conditions drive the results, which is the mechanism proposed by O’Dea 
and Sturrock (2019) and Beshears et al. (2014). In this view, the mere act of estimating and 
reporting a life expectancy causes respondents to consider information that makes them less 
optimistic regarding their lifespan relative to the information that spontaneously comes to 
mind when making a pensions decumulation choice. Relatedly, if the process of estimating 
life expectancy causes people to perceive greater uncertainty regarding their lifespan than 
they had implicitly assumed then the perceived riskiness of an annuity would be greater and, 
at the margin, risk averse individuals would be expected to switch to the certain lump sum 
(Hu and Scott, 2007; Benartzi et al., 2011). Given these various potential mechanisms, we 







5.1. Overview of results 
The core result of this paper is that prompting people to consider their life expectancy causes 
them to become less likely to annuitize. Our post-hoc tests suggest that prompting 
consideration of life expectancy induces a shift in the importance that people place on various 
aspects of a pension.  
5.2. Limitations 
Before going on to consider some concrete recommendations that derive from our results, it is 
worth exploring the limitations of our study. We caution against taking the level of preference 
for annuities reported in this survey to be a forecast of annuities demand in the UK. Our 
survey necessarily left out some important factors that warrant research in their own right. 
Notably, we presented our participants with just two options – encashment or annuitization. 
There is an income drawdown alternative that we did not offer participants and it seems likely 
that more alternatives will be developed as the market evolves. Relatedly, the annuity product 
we presented was very basic. Joint annuities and annuities with survivor benefits are offered 
on the market, but we did not give our participants these options. Additionally, there are 
attributes of the annuities product that participants may have valued idiosyncratically that we 
did not measure: for instance, expectations of high inflation or low levels of institutional trust 
would be expected to reduce preference for annuities. Another factor that is particularly 
relevant to the UK is expectations regarding state pension provision, since current levels of 
state pension are relatively high by international standards. All of these factors add noise to 
the levels of preference reported in our data.  
It is important to note, however, that concerns regarding the absolute levels of preference for 





expectancy reduces preference for annuities because this conclusion derives from differences 
across randomly assigned conditions. 
 
5.3.Conclusions 
At the outset of this research we had hoped to be able to direct policy makers from across the 
globe to the UK’s Pension Wise site as a model on how to offset the biases that lead to 
underannuitization. The UK state was a pioneer in applying choice architecture (see Dolan, 
Hallsworth, Halpern, King, Metcalfe and Vlaev, 2012) and it seemed reasonable to expect 
that its state-run Pension Wise website, introduced as part of the Pensions Freedom reforms of 
2015, harnessed this expertise. The key result from our study is that the prompt to consider 
how long a pension needs to last did not increase the likelihood of annuitizing. In the two 
conditions where the prompt made reference to life expectancy (just as the US and UK 
websites do), it significantly reduced preference for annuities relative to the control condition. 
Given the general finding from international studies that people are less likely to annuitize 
than is in their financial best interest, we conclude that these prompts are likely to exacerbate 
a pre-existing bias against annuities.  
We draw two policy conclusions from our results: a specific one and a more general lesson. 
The specific conclusion we draw is that the recommendation to consider life expectancy 
should be removed from the Pension Wise website immediately pending further investigation 
of its effects. Our results are drawn from a quota sample of UK residents and hence should 
match well with population level data. On the basis of these results, we consider the Pension 
Wise website to be actively exacerbating the bias against annuities in the UK. We further 
suggest that the US Social Security Administration conducts a randomized controlled trial to 





The more general policy lesson of our research is that experimentation can add value even in 
situations where the outcome of an intervention might appear to be a foregone conclusion. 
This study brings to light a case where experts and economic theory aligned to suggest one 
result and experiments demonstrated the opposite result. Cormac O’Dea and David Sturrock 
are leading researchers who have published extensively on lifecycle savings in the UK and its 
relation to life expectancy (see for example Banks, O’Dea and Oldfield, 2010; Bozio, Laroque 
and O’Dea, 2017; Crawford and Sturrock, 2018; O’Dea and Sturrock, 2018 and O’Dea and 
Sturrock, 2019). In a recent paper they endorsed the life expectancy information on the US 
Social Security webpage as a means to attenuate the bias against annuities and advocated a 
“role for larger policy interventions to inform households about the length of the retirement 
that they might have to fund” (O’Dea and Sturrock, 2019, p. 20). Our experiment is not alone 
in finding that the effect of prompting people to consider their life expectancy is contrary to 
what O’Dea and Sturrock hypothesized; Beshears et al. (2014) found that exposing 
respondents to mortality tables reduced annuities preference. Yet, neither we nor Beshears et 
al. (2014) had predicted that life expectancy information would reduce preference for 
annuities and neither we nor Beshears et al. (2014) can offer a decisive explanation for the 
observed result. In fact, had there been a policy debate prior to the implementation of the 
Pension Wise prompt, we would have endorsed O’Dea and Sturrock’s theory-informed 
recommendation to prompt people to consider their life expectancy. Yet, the data shows us 
humbled. The current research therefore highlights an important case: one where the 
consensus of experts is proven wrong by experimentation. 
Finally, we note that there did exist a theory that predicted the opposite results to those 
hypothesized by O’Dea and Sturrock (2019) but acknowledge that it is unsurprising that it has 
slipped the attention of economists. Terror Management Theory is a floridly psychological 





offer important predictions for economists and policymakers working on topics related to end-
of-life. 
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i There are also explanations for the annuities puzzle that accord with the standard economic framework. These 
include bequest motives (e.g. Lockwood, 2012) and a precautionary motive to have a lump sum to cover 
healthcare costs (e.g. Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2011). Here we focus on behavioural 
explanations because our goal is to test whether it is possible to redress an apparent bias against annuities. 
ii Pension Wise includes tax implications in the descriptions of taking cash on their “pension pot options” webpage 
so we replicated this. Our one deviation from the Pension Wise presentation is that its description of annuities 
does not mention tax implications, whereas our survey’s description of annuities does. We added this 
information (that people can take a tax-free 25% lump sum from their annuity) because it is true and also so as 
to insure that descriptions of both options were equally informative with regard to tax implications. The 
description of tax implications of annuities was taken verbatim from elsewhere on the Pension Wise website. 
                                                 
